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I. INTRODUCTION
As globalization spurs increased competition in the international
marketplace, countries around the world have hurried to implement
competition policies to spur economic growth.1 Two of the world’s largest
economies, India and China have recently developed and enacted new
competition laws to encourage economic development, stimulate healthy
market competition, and promote consumer welfare.2 How the law continues
to develop in those countries has a great deal to do with their respective
historical circumstances and present economic goals.3 For instance, China’s
ultimate goal is to maintain political stability. The country “relies on
economic growth to maintain its holy grail of political stability and sees
antitrust law as a driver of economic growth.”4 India’s competition act “lists
the economic development of the country as a goal of the law, which may
result in permitting anticompetitive activities that ostensibly contribute to
development goals.”5 These potentially divergent economic development
goals could have enormous implications on international business.6
This Note examines and compares the developing antitrust laws in China
and India. Both nations are still developing into true market economies, and
both see their respective competition laws as necessary parts of this
evolution. Through comparative assessment, this Note aims to identify areas
in these new antitrust laws that cause apprehension among the international
community and to make specific suggestions as to what each country can
take from the other to assuage that international concern.
The first section focuses on China’s legislative history regarding antitrust,
and details some of the economic concerns driving the country’s adoption of
new antitrust law. The second section does the same for India. The third
provides a comparative overview of the two current legal regimes, including
their relative standards and enforcement mechanisms. This Note concludes
by elaborating on both what suggestions from the international community
might be most helpful to both countries in furthering the domestic goals of
1

Christopher Hamp-Lyons, The Dragon in the Room: China’s Anti–Monopoly Law and
International Merger Review, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1577, 1582 (2009).
2
Atleen Kaur, Competition Laws in the Lands of Tigers and Dragons: A Brief Update on
India and China, 87 MICH. B.J. 34, 35 (2008).
3
Daniel A. Crane, Substance, Procedure, and Institutions in the International
Harmonization of Competition Policy, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 143, 151–55 (2009) (noting that
many emerging antitrust jurisdictions have their own historical circumstances that influence
their current competition policy goals).
4
Id. at 153.
5
Id. at 153–54 (internal quotations omitted).
6
Id. at 146–51.
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their respective competition laws, and China and India’s potential to assume
leadership roles in the movement towards global antitrust harmonization.
II. BACKGROUND
Antitrust, also known as “competition,” law has grown phenomenally in
recent years.7 As of 2010, over 120 countries had enacted a competition law
to regulate their domestic economy’s place in the melting pot that is the
international corporate market.8 Antitrust law can be succinctly defined as
“[t]he body of law designed to protect trade and commerce from restraints,
monopolies, price-fixing, and price discrimination.”9 Recently, China and
India have made their presence felt in international antitrust circles through
their drafting and enactment of new competition laws.10 In China’s case, the
2008 adoption of the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China
(AML) marks the emerging economic power’s first implementation of a
comprehensive antitrust law.11 India, on the other hand, first implemented a
competition law in 1969.12 This law, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade
Practices Act 1969 (MRTP), was adopted to deal with monopolistic practices
under a “command and control” economy.13 Since 1991, India has shifted its
economic gears to fall more in line with free market economic principles.14
Accompanying this change was the recognition that the MRTP was an
ineffective means to regulate the Indian economy in a free market context.15
7

MAHER M. DABBAH, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW 2–3 (2010).
Id. at 3.
9
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 111 (9th ed. 2009).
10
See generally Kaur, supra note 2, at 35 (“With many multinational companies either
conducting or seeking to conduct business in the two countries, and their domestic industries
experiencing unprecedented growth, it is paramount that the governments of India and China
work to ensure healthy and competitive markets to allow consumers to reap the benefits of
economic development. The Indian and Chinese governments are responding by developing
competition laws that will encourage market competition and consumer welfare.”).
11
Id. at 36; Martin Dajani, The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China: A
Business Guide 3 (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.dlapiper.com/the-anti-monopoly-law-of-thepeoples-republic-of-china-02-08-2011/.
12
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, COMPETITION LAWS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, at
India 5, 5–6 (H. Stephen Harris ed., 2d ed. 2011).
13
M.M. Sharma, India: Competition Law Enforcement Starts in India, MONDAQ (Sept. 29,
2010), http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=111152. A “command and control”
economy is one “in which the means of production are publicly owned and economic activity is
controlled by a central authority that assigns quantitative production goals and allots raw
materials to productive enterprises.” Command Economy Definition, E NCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/127708/command–economy
(last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
14
Sharma, supra note 13.
15
See Kaur, supra note 2, at 35.
8

834

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 41:831

This realization in turn led to the 2003 adoption of a new competition law,
the Competition Act of India (Competition Act) that replaces the MRTP.16
This section provides context as to the different obstacles and concerns faced
by China and India in the implementation of their new competition laws.
A. China’s Legislative History Regarding Antitrust Law
The Chinese implementation of competition law has known three distinct
eras.17 Initially, there was a complete absence of competition law.18 Before
1978, China maintained a planned economy, a system that did not allow for
unauthorized competition.19 Between 1978 and 1992, China adopted a
“planned commodity” economy; this provided for limited competition.20 In
1992 the People’s Republic of China adopted as its goal the creation of a
“socialist market economy.”21 Since the 1990s, China has become more
open to foreign investment, but such investment has been regulated to a point
far beyond that allowed by international trade organizations such as the
World Trade Organization (WTO).22 State regulation of foreign investment
began to relax in 2001 to comply with China’s accession to the WTO.23
The AML was adopted by the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Standing
Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress.24 It went into effect on
August 1, 2008 and reflects over thirteen years of drafting and consultation
with international experts.25 A number of laws were adopted prior to the
drafting of the AML, most notably the 1993 Anti-Unfair Competition Law
(AUCL) and the 1997 Price Law (Price Law), both of which govern some
antitrust issues.26 It is anticipated that the AML will supersede these other
16

ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at India 5–6.
Zhenguo Wu, Perspectives on the Chinese Anti–Monopoly Law, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 73,
73–74 (2008).
18
Id. at 73.
19
Id. at 73–74.
20
Id. at 74.
21
Id.
22
Kaur, supra note 2, at 36.
23
Id.
24
Wu, supra note 17, at 73.
25
Id. at 73, 76–78.
26
See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at China 17–19 (explaining that the
AUCL was the first Chinese law to address unfair and anticompetitive practices). Similar to
the AML, the AUCL is concerned with “unfair competition,” a loosely defined term that
refers to some antitrust issues also covered by the AML, such as predatory pricing. Whether
the AUCL continues as a law relevant to antitrust policy remains to be seen, as the AUCL
provisions that overlap with those of the AML are still effective. See id. at 19–21 (noting a
similar overlap between the Price Law and the AML concerning predatory pricing issues, but
noting that the Price Law has been invoked simultaneously with the AML, and that the Price
17
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laws over time. However, these laws still remain in effect despite the AML’s
position as “China’s only comprehensive competition statute.”27 As the
AML is meant to supplant the AUCL, the Price Law, and a host of other
semi-related antitrust provisions, the AML is the focus of this Note.28
As the brief history above highlights, China has expended a huge number
of resources in drafting what it hopes will be a comprehensive competition
law that will transition smoothly into the existing international antitrust
framework while forwarding China’s commitment to the growth of its
“socialist market economy.”
B. India’s Legislative History Regarding Antitrust Law
India attained independence in 1947.29 Shortly thereafter, India adopted
“command and control laws, rules, regulations, and executive orders.”30
India’s first competition law was the MRTP, enacted in 1969, which drew its
authority from Articles 38 and 39 of the Indian Constitution.31 The relevant
Article states: “The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by
securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which
justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the
national life.”32 The Indian command economy lasted until 1991, when the
Indian government began a program of economic liberalization.33 This shift
towards a market economy led to increased competition in the marketplace
and the decision by the Indian government to replace the MRTP Act with the
Competition Act, a decision summed up as follows:
In the pursuit of globalization, India has responded by opening
up its economy, removing controls, and resorting to
liberalization. The natural corollary to this is that the Indian
market should be geared to face competition from within the
country and outside. The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade
Practices Act, 1969, has become obsolete in certain respects in

Law’s efficacy seems to stem from its ability to reap more specific local results with regards
to price fixing).
27
Id. at China 13.
28
Id.
29
Id. at India 5.
30
Id.; see also S. Chakravarthy, Economic Nationalism and Competition Policy: The
Metamorphoses in Indian Competition Regime (2009), http://www.manupatra.in/etc/e-book/J
ournals2010/CompLRB252FF45F3C67D4980CC1953DAF7BF84/text.html.
31
INDIA CONST. art. 38, cl. 1.
32
Id.
33
Chakravarthy, supra note 30.
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the light of international economic developments, relating more
particularly to competition laws, and there is a need to shift our
focus from curbing monopolies to promoting competition.34
As such, the Indian government passed the Competition Act on January 13,
2003 and began to enact several provisions with the full force of law on
March 31, 2003.35 These provisions are to be enforced using the
adjudicatory powers of the aptly named Competition Commission of India
(CCI), an entity created by the government on October 14, 2003.36 By the
end of 2003, the provisions in force dealt mostly with the procedural
establishment of the CCI; “provisions related to anticompetitive agreements
and abuse of dominance” were not given legal effect until May 20, 2009.37
Even more recently, the Competition Act’s merger control regulations
(“combination regulations” in the terms of the Competition Act) were
enacted on June 1, 2011.38
The large temporal gap between the initial adoption of the Competition
Act’s procedural and substantive provisions was caused by a lawsuit alleging
that the CCI’s adjudicatory powers constituted a violation of India’s
separation of powers doctrine.39 The CCI as a functioning body was placed
in limbo from 2003 until 2007, when the Competition (Amendment) Act was
passed by Parliament.40 The Amendment Act created the Competition
Appellate Tribunal, and requires the Tribunal to be chaired by either a retired
Supreme Court Justice or a High Court Chief Justice.41 This Tribunal will
serve as an adjudicatory oversight body for the CCI.42
While India’s competition law has been slower to get off the ground than
China’s AML, the fact that most of the Competition Act’s substantive
provisions are now fully implemented and helmed by one adjudicative body
34
VINOD DHALL, COMPETITION LAW TODAY: CONCEPTS, ISSUES, AND THE LAW IN PRACTICE
499, 499–500 (2007).
35
See Anurag K. Agarwal, Competition Law in India: Need to Go Slow and Steady 3
(Indian Inst. on Mgmt. Ahmedabad, Working Paper No. 2005–10–05, 2005), available at
http://ideas.repec.org/p/iim/iimawp/wp01912.html (noting the ratification and implementation
dates of the Competition Act).
36
Sharma, supra note 13.
37
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at India 6–7.
38
Yash A. Rana, India: India’s New Competition Guidelines Present a Minefield for M&A
and Private Equity Globally, MONDAQ (July 6, 2011), http://mondaq.com/x/137862/Trade+Re
gulation+Practices/Indias+New+Competition+Guidelines+Present+a+Minefield+for+MA+an
d+Private+Equity+Globally.
39
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at India 7.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
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promotes faith that the Competition Act will prove to be a more effective
mechanism to govern competition law than the MRTP.
C. Economic Goals of Antitrust Law Generally
Each country that has adopted a competition law (over 120 and counting)
has done so to regulate a market economy and to prevent private industry
from wielding its power in a manner that would undermine national
economic growth.43 This type of regulation is generally held to foster the
growth of healthy competition thereby creating markets responsive to
consumer needs, which should in turn result in heightened consumer welfare
and economic efficiency.44 While these tenets are generally held to be true,
each country that adopts a competition law does so for more specific,
secondary policy reasons as well, and it is these secondary reasons that are
the focus of this section.45
D. China’s Economic Goals Regarding Antitrust Law
The main impetus behind China’s drafting and subsequent adoption of the
AML was the country’s accession to the WTO.46 Since the economic
opening-up of 1979, China’s economy has been in a boom period, and
maintaining this growth is the government’s main economic concern.47
China’s economic growth during this boom came at the expense of many of
its state-owned enterprises (SOEs), a sector viewed as “key engines of
economic development.”48
China’s concern that increased domestic
43

See DHALL, supra note 34, at 3 (explaining the general economic goals of competition law).
See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2004, Competition,
Competitiveness and Development: Lessons From Developing Countries, 3, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2004/1 (2004), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/Docs/ditcclp200
41_en.pdf [hereinafter United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] (explaining the
broad economic policy for implementation of competition laws).
45
The proposition that China and India fall in line with the majority of other countries’
reasons for adopting new competition law is supported by the texts of their respective laws.
Fan long duan fa [Anti–Monopoly Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.
Gaz. 517–23 (P.R.C.), art. 2 [hereinafter AML]; The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12 of 2003,
INDIA CODE (2003), pmbl. [hereinafter the Competition Act].
46
See H. Stephen Harris, Jr., The Making of an Antitrust Law: The Pending Anti–Monopoly
Law of the People’s Republic of China, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 169, 176–77 (2006) (explaining that
China’s accession to the WTO and the ensuing international concerns about transparency
prompted the drafting of the AML).
47
See id. at 173 (noting that reforms and legislative enactments led to China’s economic
growth over the last several decades).
48
Id. at 174, 176.
44
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competition from foreign firms would result in Chinese job loss due to the
“inevitable demise of unproductive state-owned industries” highlights
China’s main interest other than general economic growth—maintaining
domestic tranquility.49 This interest, dubbed “Harmonious Society,” is
especially salient under a monist political regime, as any marked decrease in
the overall quality of life could result in political instability, something China
is anxious to avoid.50 The AML’s drafting process shows the Chinese
commitment to maintaining the “Harmonious Society” in the midst of its
transition to a more open, global economy.51
The overarching goal of the AML’s drafters was to write the law in a
manner that would allow China’s “socialist market economy” to develop in
compliance with international practices and to promote an economic system
with self-regulating “natural selection” wherein the strongest firms survive
and thrive.52 The drafters were guided by four principles. First, that the
AML reflect China’s adoption of a new, market economy system.53 Second,
that the AML should mirror the development of the Chinese economy and
incrementally impose its anti-monopoly framework.54 Third, the AML
should borrow liberally from more established foreign legislation and fit
them onto the Chinese antitrust frame.55 Fourth, the drafters were to ensure
that the AML complied with the reality and requirements of a global
economy in order to aid in China’s integration into the global framework.56
These guiding principles bode well for the flexibility of the AML, which
is necessary for the law to adapt to the disparate demands that will be placed
on its use by the international community. China’s vested interest in
maintaining control over the development of the economy, in an area like
antitrust where success depends on foreign investment, requires laudable
juggling skills on the part of China’s government, especially because many

49

Id. at 176.
Maureen Fan, China’s Party Leadership Declares New Priority: ‘Harmonious Society’
Doctrine Proposed By President Hu Formally Endorsed, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2006, at A18.
51
See Harris, supra note 46, at 177–83 (noting that internal support for liberalization and
legal reform has been tempered by the prospect of consequential bankruptcies, job losses, and
social unrest and providing an outline of the drafting process).
52
Wu, supra note 17, at 77–78; see also AML, supra note 45, art. 1 (“This Law is
formulated with the goal of preventing and curtailing monopolistic practices, protecting fair
market competition, increasing economic efficiency, safeguarding the interests of consumers
as well as society as a whole, and promoting the healthy development of the socialist market
economy.”).
53
Wu, supra note 17, at 78–79.
54
Id. at 79.
55
Id.
56
Id.
50
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Western experts lack any real idea as to how the AML should react to
China’s unique situation.57
E. India’s Economic Goals Regarding Antitrust Law
All countries, especially developing ones, face unique challenges in
implementing a competition law and have specific reasons for doing so. As
noted above, a widely accepted objective for any competition law is to
enhance economic efficiency as a means to spur economic development.58 It
is commonly held that such development will lower prices and enrich the
overall welfare of the consumer, who will then be in a better position to
inject capital back into the economic artery.59 This injection rewards
innovation, thus encouraging further economic development.60 In India,
these goals were to be carried out by the MRTP, and a brief synopsis of that
law’s failings is necessary to understand India’s reasons for implementing
the Competition Act.61
Like China, India opened its economy in the early 1990s.62 This opening
led to trade liberalization and a commensurate increase in foreign
corporations establishing a presence in India.63 This foreign business
presence, in addition to India’s obligations to the WTO, led the Indian
government to the realization that the MRTP as it stood in the 1990s needed
to change if it were to adequately protect Indian industry.64 The Indian
government appointed a committee to formulate a competition policy that
would allow for legislation appropriate for India’s new place in the global
economy.65 As noted previously, the committee decided that India required a
new competition law.66 The MRTP lacked a provision allowing for the
creation of a “watchdog for the introduction and maintenance of competition
policy.”67 The Committee also found that “[c]ompetition law should deal
with anti-competitive practices, particularly cartelization, price-fixing and
other abuses of market power and should regulate mergers,” something the

57

Hamp–Lyons, supra note 1, at 1597–98.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 44, at 3.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Aditya Bhattacharjea, India’s New Competition Law: A Comparative Assessment, 4 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 609, 610 (2008).
62
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at India 6.
63
T. RAMAPPA, COMPETITION LAW IN INDIA: POLICY, ISSUES, AND DEVELOPMENTS 6 (2006).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 8.
67
Id. at 7.
58
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MRTP did not do.68 As such, the MRTP was perceived as an impotent
measure to combat unfair competition.69
Taking these findings into account, the Indian government unveiled the
Competition Act in 2003.70 The principle objectives as stated in the
Competition Act are to:
[P]rovide, . . . keeping
in
view
of
the
economic
development . . . of the Indian economy, . . . for the
establishment of a Competition Commission to prevent
practices having adverse effect on competition, to promote and
sustain competition [in Indian markets], to protect the interests
of consumers and to ensure freedom of trade carried on by
other participants in markets in India, and for matters therewith
or incidental thereto.71
Typically, developing countries enact competition laws with dual sets of
objectives.72 The primary objectives of the Competition Act are of a macroeconomic nature and deal with broad ideas like consumer welfare and
economic development.73 “[T]he ultimate objective of the competition
law . . . is the protection of the interest of the consumer,” a primary objective
more fully defined in the Competition Act.74 The secondary objectives
typically included in competition laws describe the country’s more local,
specialized needs.75
Unlike the AML, no secondary reasons for
promulgating the Competition Act have been given.76
Whether these primary objectives will be met through Indian antitrust
regulation remains to be seen. India faces challenges unique from those
being confronted in China, beginning with how India’s competition law will
coexist with India’s democratic government. The Indian government does
not have the power to enforce a state resolution like China’s “Harmonious
Society,” and its democracy prevents it from making swift changes to react

68

Id.
Id. at 17.
70
Id. at 1.
71
The Competition Act, supra note 45, Statement of Objects and Reasons, ¶ 1.
72
Shiju Varghese Mazhuvanchery, The Indian Competition Act: A Historical and
Developmental Perspective, 3 L. & DEV. REV., no. 2, at 241, 254 (2010).
73
Id. at 255.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 254.
76
Id. at 254–55.
69
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and deal with unforeseen antitrust issues.77 This problem was one of the
reasons behind the failure of the MRTP, but it has been addressed in the new
competition law.78 All in all, it is apparent that the economic goal of the
Competition Act is in its name: it strives to promote the national desire for
Indian corporations to “level the playing field” with incoming international
firms.79
III. MERGER REVIEW IN CHINA AND INDIA
Mergers “are the combination of previously independent firms into one
firm.”80 This type of corporate interbreeding can effectively occur in two
ways: through a formal merger combining two separate corporations into a
single entity, or by one corporation absorbing another corporation’s assets.81
This distinction is unimportant in the context of antitrust law and
governance; the salient concern is that a merger changes what were once
separate, competitive businesses into a common business entity with a single
profit interest.82
These types of business combinations are typically addressed, via merger
laws, in three ways: notification procedures, merger thresholds, and public
benefit assessments.83 This section explores merger review under the AML
77

See India’s Surprising Economic Miracle: The Country’s State May Be Weak, But Its
Private Companies Are Strong, ECONOMIST (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.economist.com/no
de/17147648 (comparing how in China, when the government decides to dam a river, build a
road, or move a village, the dam goes up, the road goes down and the village disappears
without citizens standing in the way).
78
See RAMAPPA, supra note 63, at 45 (detailing how Section 49 of the Competition Act has
allowed for the CCI to present its opinion to the Indian government prior to the adoption of
any new competition policies). Although the government is not bound by the opinion of the
CCI, the review process does allow for the hope of consistency in future antitrust
amendments. Id.
79
Id. at xiii–xiv. Ramappa further suggests that the government should resist the initial
urge to tamper too much with the goings–on in the marketplace but should instead halt at
laying the groundwork for healthy competition to exist.
80
EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 871
(2007).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
MARTYN TAYLOR, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW: A NEW DIMENSION FOR THE
WTO? 85 (2006). Notification procedures “typically involve a procedure whereby firms
notify a competition authority of mergers and acquisitions that may create excessive market
concentration or otherwise adversely impact on competition.” Id. at 85–86. Merger
thresholds define a certain measure that, if exceeded, requires a nation’s antitrust authority to
investigate the effects of the proposed merger. See id. at 87–88 (explaining the different types
of merger thresholds and their use as tools by many competition law authorities). A public
benefit assessment requires the antitrust authority to weigh the anticipated societal benefits
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and the Competition Act, as well as the enforcement mechanisms present in
each of the two laws.
A. Standards of Review and Extraterritorial Effects of Mergers
As globalization increases, there is an increasingly high risk that proposed
mergers be subjected to review in an ever-larger number of jurisdictions.84
Where a merger requires international comity to ensure success, one nation’s
objection can derail the entire process.85 If a nation’s dismissal of an
attempted merger is viewed by the international community as lacking a
legitimate antitrust basis and is perceived as solely a means to favor its own
domestic goals, serious tensions can arise between the affected countries.86
As the number of countries with full-fledged competition laws grows, so
too does the number of competition laws that have extraterritorial effect.87
The potential commercial dangers caused by this proliferation of
extraterritorial regulation are evident in the proposed merger of General
Electric (GE) and Honeywell International, two U.S. companies incorporated
in and operated from the U.S. The U.S. cleared the transaction, but the
European Union blocked the merger due to its perceived potential for
monopolistic practice.88 The result of the European Commission’s decision
was that the merger was blocked in both the European Union (EU) and in the
U.S., despite neither party to the proposed merger being European.89 This
highlights the unfortunate reality that individual nations, in applying their
respective competition laws, have no duty to show deference to other nations
in their assessment of a merger’s validity, even where both corporations hail
from a foreign nation.90

that could grow from a merger against the potential anti–competitive effects stemming from
the merger. See id. at 89 (explaining how public benefit can outweigh anti–competitive
effects in certain situations).
84
Hamp–Lyons, supra note 1, at 1578–79.
85
Id. at 1579.
86
See id. at 1599–1602 (detailing international concerns over potentially protectionist
application of the AML).
87
See Anu Piilola, Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case Study of
International Antitrust Regulation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 207 (explaining how, despite
antitrust laws being predominantly national laws, their extraterritorial application has been the
traditional means by which nations deal with antitrust issues).
88
Eleanor M. Fox, The European Court’s Judgment in GE/Honeywell: Not a Poster Child
For Comity or Convergence, 20 SPG ANTITRUST 77, 77–78 (2006).
89
Kyle Robertson, Note, One Law to Control Them All: International Merger Analysis in
the Wake of GE/Honeywell, 31 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 153, 154.
90
Id. at 155.

2013]

CAN THE TIGER SIT DOWN WITH THE DRAGON?

843

The U.S. and EU antitrust laws are the two most developed bodies of
antitrust law in the world91 and are generally held to be very similar in their
treatment of antitrust issues.92 If these two long-developing bodies of law
can reach such opposite views on a merger, it is no wonder that the global
business community monitors the infancy of Chinese and Indian antitrust law
with apprehension. As two of the largest emerging markets on the planet, a
great number of potential mergers will fall under the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of their respective competition laws.93 The way these two
eastern giants review mergers and enforce their decisions will likely play a
huge role on the international economic stage as competition laws develop.
1. Mergers/Combinations—Standards of Review Under the AML
While the provisions of the AML as a whole are enforced by an
administrative hydra comprised of the Anti-Monopoly Commission (AMC),
the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authorities (AMEA), and the Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM), merger review is commenced solely under the
auspices of MOFCOM.94 The standards of review for mergers under the
AML are laid out in the fourth chapter of the AML, “Concentration of
Business Operators.”95 “Concentration of Business Operators” for purposes
of the AML is defined in Article 20, and refers to three types of
concentrations: “mergers[,] acquisitions of control of another business
operator through acquisition of equity or assets[,] and acquisitions of control
of, or of the capacity to exercise decisive influence over, another business
operator by contract or other means.”96 Operator concentration can either
promote or hinder competition in a globalized economy.97

91
See William Sugden, Note, Global Antitrust and the Evolution of an International
Standard, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 989, 1007 (2002) (calling the United States and the EU
“the two superpowers of world antitrust regimes”).
92
Robertson, supra note 89, at 155–56.
93
See discussion supra Part II.
94
Janet L. McDavid & Jun Wei, Merger Control Under China’s Anti–Monopoly Law:
High-Profile Cases and Key Developments, in 2 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, ANTITRUST
INSTITUTE 2011: DEVELOPMENTS & HOT TOPICS 989, 991 (2011).
95
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at China 41.
96
See id. (explaining AML Article 20); see also AML, supra note 45, art. 20.
97
See Wu, supra note 17, at 87–88 (“[C]oncentration is an important means to increase
scope, realize economies of scale . . . and, accordingly, lower market risk and increase
competitiveness. At the same time, operator concentrations can decrease or even eliminate
competitors in the market . . . and, accordingly, threaten effective competition . . . .”).
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Article 27 of the AML identifies several factors MOFCOM should
consider when engaged in merger review.98 The required documents to file
with MOFCOM are similar to those required by the European Union, but
documents written in a language other than Chinese must be accompanied by
a Chinese translation.99 Much of the specific guidance for merger review
under the AML is still in draft form and, as such, is of only limited utility for
foreign corporations seeking to expand into China. This problem is
compounded by the fact that little analysis of how MOFCOM applies these
regulations currently exists, making it difficult to anticipate exactly how
MOFCOM’s analysis of a proposed merger will come out.100 The most
informative analysis currently available can be found in MOFCOM’s public
merger decisions. However, MOFCOM’s explanations contain significant
omissions and potential for errors in interpretation.101
Despite the brevity of MOFCOM decisions, certain insights into the
review process can be gleaned from the decisions issued thus far.102 For
example, where the merger involves the “combination of well-known
brands,” there is a heightened risk of scrutiny.103 Heightened care should
also be taken where a company involved in a merger has a dominant or
leading position in the market, especially where the proposed merger could
threaten smaller domestic companies.104
MOFCOM’s standard for review of proposed mergers, while murky,
appears to offer an improvement over China’s law on the subject prior to the
adoption of the AML.105 Previous to the adoption of the AML, China
implemented a merger review process that applied only to “foreign
98
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at China 50; see also AML, supra note
45, art. 27 (“The following factors should be considered when investigating Operator
consolidations: (1) The relevant market share of Operators party to the consolidation as well
as their ability to control the market; (2) The degree of consolidation in relevant markets; (3)
The effect of the consolidation on market entry and technological advance; (4) The effect of
the consolidation on consumers and other Operators; (5) The effect of the consolidation on
national economic development; and (6) Other factors that the State Council anti–monopoly
law enforcement authorities regard as worth consideration.”).
99
McDavid & Wei, supra note 94, at 991–92.
100
Id. at 995.
101
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at China 50, 52. An example of
MOFCOM’s public statements regarding proposed mergers can be found at Andrew Batson,
China’s Statement Blocking Coca–Cola Huiyuan Deal, CHINA REAL TIME REPORT (Mar. 18,
2009, 6:58 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/03/18/china%E2%80%99s-statementblocking-coca-cola-huiyuan-deal/.
102
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at China 52.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Wentong Zheng, Transplanting Antitrust in China: Economic Transition, Market
Structure, and State Control, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 643, 708–09 (2010).
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companies seeking to acquire domestic Chinese companies.”106 According
to Article 2 of the AML, merger review now encompasses proposed
domestic mergers, although in effect little has changed, as all published
merger reviews have involved foreign companies.107 However, the fact that
the law identifies domestic mergers as within MOFCOM’s power should
encourage international investors, especially in light of MOFCOM’s track
record of granting approval. The agency has reviewed seven proposed
mergers, and allowed six of them to move forward.108 As each of these
mergers involved a foreign corporation, this approval rate should give
investors a reason to feel cautiously optimistic about their chances for
success with a merger proposal in China.
2. Mergers/Combinations—Standards of Review Under the Competition
Act
The Competition Act’s provisions regarding merger control came into
effect on June 1, 2011.109 The Competition Act forbids any person or
enterprise from entering into a merger that “causes or is likely to cause an
appreciable adverse effect on competition within the relevant market in India
and such a combination shall be void.”110 A “combination” for purposes of
the Competition Act can mean any merger or acquisition that would result in
“control, shares, voting rights or assets” whose value eclipses certain
thresholds laid out in the Competition Act.111 “Combination” also refers to
an acquisition “of control by a person over an enterprise when such person
has already direct or indirect control over another enterprise engaged in
production, distribution or trading of a similar or identical or substitutable
goods or provision of a similar or identical or substitutable service, if” the
newly acquired business has assets within or outside India worth over the
106

Id. at 708.
Id. at 708–09.
108
Id.
109
Rana, supra note 38.
110
The Competition Act, supra note 45, § 6(1).
111
Id. § 5(a). “Control,” for purposes of the Competition Act, is defined as “controlling the
affairs or management by (i) one or more enterprises, either jointly or singly, over another
enterprise or group [or] (ii) one or more groups, either jointly or singly, over another group or
enterprise.” Id. § 5, explanation (a). A “group” is found
when two or more enterprises are, directly or indirectly, in a position to (i)
exercise 26 percent or more of the voting rights in the other enterprise; or (ii)
appoint more than 50 percent of the members of the board of directors of the
other enterprise, or (iii) control the management or affairs of the other
enterprise.
Id. § 5, explanation (b).
107
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amount set by the Act.112 Finally, “combination” can also, according to the
Competition Act, refer to a merger or amalgamation between businesses
where the combining parties cross the location and asset value thresholds laid
out in the Act.113 The value of the threshold assets is measured according to
the previous year’s audited totals, and takes into account such intangibles as
goodwill, trademark, copyright and a host of other factors.114
While the portions of the Competition Act dealing with combinations
were implemented well after the Act’s other substantive provisions, the CCI
spent that time accepting criticism of its Draft Combination Regulations
from interested parties around the world.115 Many of these criticisms were
taken to heart by the CCI and were addressed with the May 11, 2011
publication of the Competition Commission of India (Procedure in regard to
the transaction of business relating to combinations) Regulations, 2011
(Combination Regulations).116 While the CCI’s apparent willingness to
accept criticism should be looked upon favorably by many in the
international community, commentators have made clear that the changes
have not answered all questions nor smoothed all perceived wrinkles from
the combination regulations.117
The Competition Act lays out a list of factors similar to those utilized in
the AML that the CCI is required to consider in “determining whether a
combination would have the effect of or is likely to have an appreciable
adverse effect on competition in the relevant market . . . .”118 The CCI acted
quickly in showing its willingness to exercise its powers of review, passing
its first clearance of a proposed combination on July 26, 2011, just over one
month after the Competition Act’s combination provisions were brought into
force.119
112

Id. § 5(b).
Id. § 5(c).
114
Id. § 5, explanation (c).
115
See David A. Carpenter et al., Competition M&A Rules in India Finalized, MAYER BROWN
LEGAL UPDATE (May, 2011), available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/Competitio
n-MampA-rules-in-India-finalized-05-11-2011/ (detailing the adjustments made between the
Draft Regulations and the Combination Regulations).
116
Rana, supra note 38; the Competition Commission of India (Procedure in Regard to the
Transaction of Business Relating to Combinations) Regulations, No. 3 of 2011, INDIA CODE
(2011), vol. 98.
117
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
118
See the Competition Act, supra note 45, § 20(4) (laying out the fourteen factors the CCI
should consider in ruling on whether a proposed combination is or is not acceptable).
119
Kian Ganz, Breaking: AZB, TTA Get First Ever CCI Combination Clearance in 18 Days
for Reliance–Bharti AXA Merger, LEGALLY INDIA (July 27, 2011, 7:58 PM), http://www.leg
allyindia.com/201107272238/Competition-Law/breaking-azb-tta-get-first-ever-cci-combinat
ion-clearance-in-18-days-for-reliance-bharti-axa-merger.
113
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B. Enforcement Under the AML
MOFCOM is tasked with enforcement of the AML’s provisions
concerning mergers and acquisitions.120 MOFCOM has the power to either
clear a proposed combination or to further investigate its potential effects on
competition.121 This initial decision must be made within thirty days of the
agency receiving notice of the proposed transaction.122 MOFCOM can
directly block a proposed merger where this initial inquiry convinces the
agency that “[o]perator consolidation has the effect of restricting or
eliminating competition . . . .”123 If a proposed merger or acquisition passes
MOFCOM’s initial scrutiny, the transaction could still be subject to further
restrictions per Article 29 of the AML, which allows MOFCOM “to place
restrictive conditions on the consolidation which will diminish its negative
effects on market competition.”124 MOFCOM is charged with making its
reasoning public when it denies a proposed combination or when it forces
restrictive conditions as a prerequisite for a combination to move forward.125
However, MOFCOM’s explanations for its decisions relating to mergers thus
far have been scant.126
C. Enforcement Under the Competition Act
In India, the CCI enforces the Competition Act under Chapter IV of the
Act.127 In rendering its judgment on whether a combination will have a
deleterious effect on competition, the CCI follows “principles of natural
justice,” and is not bound by India’s Code of Civil Procedure.128 This phrase
“refers to allowing each person for whom there is an investigation to have an

120

McDavid & Wei, supra note 94, at 991–92.
Id.
122
AML, supra note 45, art. 25.
123
Id. art. 28. It is worthwhile to note that Article 28 allows the “Operator” to rebut such a
finding through a showing that the transaction’s potential to foster competition or to promote
the “public interest” clearly outweighs its potential negative effects on competition. Id. The
AML does not elucidate exactly how such potential can be shown, nor does it define “public
interest.” Id.
124
Id. art. 29.
125
Id. art. 30.
126
See Batson, supra note 101 (demonstrating that while MOFCOM does make statements
public, thus living up to its duties under AML Article 30, these statements do not provide
insight into the agency’s decision making process beyond MOFCOM’s assessment that a
transaction will have negative effects on competition).
127
See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at India 28–29 (outlining the
enforcement duties and obligations of the CCI).
128
Id. at India 30.
121
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opportunity of being heard; this concept is presented in the legal maxim audi
alteram partem, which means ‘no man shall be condemned unheard.’ ”129
Once the relevant merger documentation has been submitted to the CCI,
the Competition Act gives the CCI the power to allow the transaction to
progress or to disallow the transaction.130 The CCI makes this inquiry based
on its own knowledge and information, which explains why premerger
notification is mandatory under the Competition Act.131 Section 20 of the
Competition Act lays out the methodology for the CCI’s investigation of a
supposed violation of the Act’s regulations on combinations.132 The CCI
may also, if it believes that the proposed combination will have an adverse
effect on competition, order appropriate modification of the agreement where
it believes such modification will remedy the anti-competitive effects of the
combination.133
IV. INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS
There are a host of international concerns regarding China’s and India’s
implementation of their merger laws.134 This section provides an overview
of some of the more current concerns expressed by the international
community beginning with the possible extraterritorial effects of the two
laws. This section then briefly highlights more specific concerns regarding
each of the two countries.
A. Extraterritoriality
Competition laws have proliferated throughout the developing world in
recent years; China and India are two of the larger players on the world stage
to have implemented them. Merger control regimes have grown
exponentially, to the point where “[m]erger control is out of control.”135 The
AML’s extraterritorial effects are laid out in Article 2, which states that

129

Id.
The Competition Act, supra note 45, § 31(1)–(2).
131
RAMAPPA, supra note 63, at 258; see also The Competition Act, supra note 45, § 6(2)
(requiring notice of impending mergers of amalgamations).
132
See RAMAPPA, supra note 63, at 258 (explaining the procedure the CCI implements in
assessing a combination).
133
The Competition Act, supra note 45, § 31(3).
134
See Kaur, supra note 2, at 35–36 (identifying some concerns with the AML and the
Competition Act).
135
KY P. EWING JR., COMPETITION RULES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: PRINCIPLES FROM
AMERICA’S EXPERIENCE 45 (2d ed. 2006) (quoting Eleanor Fox, Can We Control Merger
Control?: An Experiment, POLICY DIRECTIONS FOR GLOBAL MERGER REVIEW 79–90 (1999)).
130
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“[t]his Law is applicable to monopolistic practices as part of economic
activities occurring within the People’s Republic of China.”136 This law also
applies to monopolistic practices outside of China that have the effect or
eliminating of restricting Chinese market competition.”137 Section 32 of the
Competition Act explicitly expands the CCI’s mandate to transactions
outside of India’s borders if the transaction at issue “has, or is likely to have,
an appreciable adverse effect on competition in the relevant market in
India.”138
One problem the international community has with the extraterritorial
effects of these laws is their potential to be wielded as a type of unilateral
bludgeon, meaning that MOFCOM or the CCI could potentially block
transnational mergers that have little to do with their respective nations.139
This type of nationalistic behavior is not uncommon among developed
countries, and it follows that developing nations seeking to promote their
own domestic agendas through antitrust law would not balk at similar
behavior if doing so would promote their economic policy.140 However,
extraterritorial abuse of their respective antitrust laws would likely be a selfdefeating move for China or India. Each country created a competition law
as a means to encourage and control the growth of its domestic economy.141
Abuse of the extraterritorial reach of the AML or Competition Act would
stymie these attempts, because such behavior could decrease foreign
investment in Chinese or Indian industry due to the likely perception that the
Chinese and Indian antitrust authorities are overly protectionist.142

136

AML, supra note 45, art. 2.
Id.
138
The Competition Act, supra note 45, § 32.
139
See MAHER M. DABBAH, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF ANTITRUST POLICY 3, 5 (2003)
(explaining how a country’s apparent willingness to apply its’ antitrust laws extraterritorially
creates friction between foreign governments and can be damaging to firms engaged in
international business).
140
See Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, and
Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781, 1803–05 (2000) (cataloging incidences where developed
countries, like the United States, Japan, and the European Union, have antagonistically
employed their antitrust laws in the past).
141
See discussion supra Part II.C (explaining how the respective texts of the AML and the
Competition Act each support the idea that they were adopted to promote economic growth).
142
See Li Yanping, China Dismisses Retaliation Fears Over Coke Decision (Update 1),
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 20, 2009, 4:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchiv
e&sid=aMFZ5ZcMXYM0 (addressing protectionist concerns in China regarding the blocked
Coca-Cola/Huiyuan Juice Company deal).
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B. International Concerns Regarding the AML
While the AML is generally quite similar to the U.S. and EU antitrust
laws, there are some specific differences in the AML that create pointed
apprehension among members of the international community with a
business interest in the Chinese market.143 One notable difference is the
AML’s purpose of promoting the socialist market economy.144 This goal
allows for a broad interpretation of the potential breadth of the law and its
application, because the AML does not define the method used to achieve
this goal.145
Other prevalent concerns with the application of the AML’s merger
provisions are that its provisions incorporate “additional, non-competition
related factors into the analysis . . .” of whether a merger will be allowed.146
The most troubling of these is the term “national security,” the exact
definition of which is not provided in the text of the AML.147 It has been
posited that the best way to understand the application of such undefined
terms is to investigate the case law, which might be true in a country like the
U.S. that has provided detailed judicial review of mergers, but has proven
mostly unhelpful in shedding light on MOFCOM’s assessment process in
China.148
C. International Concerns Regarding the Competition Act
While concerns over the AML revolve around the fact that it continues to
leave many variables unknown, the international consensus on the
Competition Act is that its implementation has taken many international
concerns regarding its drafting into account.149 The issues lie less with what
the Competition Act leaves unsaid and more with what it lays out explicitly.
One example of this is concern over the potential 210 day statutory time
frame allowed for review and approval of any combination.150 This potential
lag in time is especially irksome due to the potential extraterritorial effects of
143

Susan Beth Farmer, The Impact of China’s Antitrust Law and Other Competition Policies
on U.S. Companies, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 34, 35 (2010).
144
AML, supra note 45, art. 1.
145
Farmer, supra note 143, at 42–46.
146
Id. at 36.
147
Id. at 46.
148
Id. at 46–48.
149
Carpenter et al., supra note 115, at 1.
150
See id. at 2–3 (explaining that the 210 day statutory time frame allowed for the CCI to
pass final orders remains unchanged, and that this timeframe could negatively impact foreign
mergers that have little practical effect in India).
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a CCI review. Concerns also exist regarding potential sectoral overlap
between the CCI and other regulators and how this will affect companies’
ability to comply with the requirements of multiple regulators.151 The most
troublesome perceived shortcoming of the Competition Act has little to do
with the law itself, but instead deals with the perceived inability of the CCI
to maintain the necessary confidentiality to avoid harming companies’ stock
price and to avoid what has been, in India, a historically cut-throat
environment for corporate rivalry.152
These international concerns beg the question, how far should either
China or India go in attempting to placate the nations expressing these
concerns? To what degree should China or India subordinate its own stated
goals regarding merger regulation and antitrust law? If it is in fact worth the
trouble each country would go through to assuage these concerns, what
models exist that China and India can follow? The next section focuses on
these issues and attempts to answer whether, regardless of international
pressure, the international community should expect China and India to at
some point “look out for number one,” and that such self-service should be
expected from developing economies.
V. HARMONIZATION: WORTH THE TROUBLE OR JUST TOO MUCH
DISSONANCE?
Arguably, neither China nor India should make a meaningful change to
their laws. China’s economy, as well as India’s, continues to grow at an
exceptionally high rate even amidst the current global economic recession.153
Both the AML and the Competition Act were implemented for similar
reasons, namely to regulate foreign entities in their domestic operations
within China and India and to entice foreign business investment, and it can

151
See Zerick Dastur, India: Sectoral Interplay and the Antitrust Regime, MONDAQ (July 6,
2011), http://mondaq.com/x/136230/Antitrust+Competition/Sectoral+Interplay+And+The+Anti
+Trust+Regime (detailing how merger regulation under the CCI could potentially butt heads
with other specialized sectoral regulators, specifically in the banking industry).
152
Kiran S. Desai et al., India: India Competition Report, MONDAQ, section 3 (Aug. 19,
2011), http://mondaq.com/x/143274/Price+Fixing/India+Competition+Report; Zerick Dastur,
India: Competition Law Only After It Sinks In, MONDAQ (June 24, 2011), http://mondaq.com/
x/136224/Antitrust+Competition/Competiti on+Law+Only+After+It+Sinks+In.
153
See China Overview, WORLD BANK (2013), http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/
overview (outlining how China’s economy has grown throughout the last decade); India
Overview, WORLD B ANK (2013), http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/india/overview
(discussing India’s rapid growth over the last decade).
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be claimed that both systems are currently mechanisms to achieve these
goals.154
However, this assertion fails to account for a couple important factors.
First, both the AML and the Competition Act’s merger regulation provisions
are new laws representative of each country’s first attempt at comprehensive
regulation of a market economy.155 India’s merger guidelines are still being
tweaked to fit into the international merger control puzzle more comfortably.
The AML’s opacity and lack of predictable enforcement thus far has shed
very little light on how its requirements are analyzed by MOFCOM, which
might be negatively impacting China’s attempts at inducing foreign
investment through mergers. As shown by its opinion explaining why CocaCola’s proposed merger with Huiyuan Fruit Juice was denied, MOFCOM
has not been overly forthcoming in its explanations other than its vague
references to undefined notions of a merger’s “adverse effects on
competition,” and that merger review goals are to “protect fair market
competition[ ] and to safeguard the interests of consumers as well as the
public interest.”156 India has shown itself to be open to input from foreign
countries in its efforts to refine the Competition Act, as evidenced by the
willingness of the CCI to incorporate suggestions from the international
community into the new Combination Regulations.157 This demonstrates
that, at least in the early stage of adoption, the CCI will likely be amenable to
changing parts of the law to better accommodate international concerns.
Of course, that China and India’s merger provisions have yet to cause
harmful friction among the international community or the business investors
the two countries wish to regulate and attract does not mean the laws should
remain static. There are other questions to be answered regarding whether
China and India should harmonize their laws to further fit international laws,
and if such an attempt is worth either country’s efforts.158
A. Harmonization: Who Will Benefit?
As the number of countries adopting national competition laws continues
to increase, two prominent ideas regarding the process of harmonizing these
laws have emerged. The first is that harmonization between different
154
See discussion supra Part II.C (explaining the reasons behind the adoption of the AML
and The Competition Act).
155
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 12, at China 7, India 6–7.
156
Batson, supra note 101.
157
See generally Desai et al., supra note 152 (explaining the suggested changes from the
international community that were implemented in the CCI Regulations).
158
Diane P. Wood, International Harmonization of Antitrust Law: The Tortoise or the
Hare?, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391, 398 (2002).
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jurisdictions’ laws would benefit many of the “relevant stakeholders”
concerned with international competition law.159 The second is that,
regardless of the net positive effects such harmonization would create, it is
an unlikely achievement at any point in the near future.160 While it is settled
that some countries would gain were global competition laws to be
harmonized, it is unclear which countries would make up that group. As
developing economies, China and India might be better served, at least for
the present, by tending their own burgeoning expertise in the application of
their respective competition laws at the expense of the international antitrust
community. However, this assertion carries little weight in a vacuum, and
therefore additional questions must be answered.
The first question in assessing international competition law
harmonization is, who needs harmonization?161 In the merger context, the
business community has made it known that they would endorse further
harmonization.162 They believe that harmonization, will cut down on
transaction costs and will prevent the much-feared “hold-up” situation,
wherein the country with the most stringent merger review policy will be in a
position to block a merger that may have only a passing relationship with its
national interests.163 Also, further harmonization is thought to reduce
transaction costs by cutting down on the number of competition authorities
that a company must notify before proceeding with a planned merger.164
This concern speaks to many nations’ concerns regarding the extraterritorial
effects of China and India’s competition laws. China’s history of seeking
council from countries with more experience regulating competition laws
prior to adopting the AML, as well as India’s willingness to implement
suggestions from the international community in its enactment of the
Competition Act’s merger provisions, make a plausible case that the two
countries would be amenable to addressing this concern through further
harmonization.165
Another question that needs to be addressed is, “would there be other
unintended consequences from a push to harmonize competition laws,
resulting from the fact that each country and region presently has a
159

Crane, supra note 3, at 143.
Id.
161
Wood, supra note 158, at 398.
162
Id. at 399.
163
Id. at 399–400.
164
See id. at 399 (detailing the inefficiencies and burdens created by the current network of
disparate competition laws, including filing costs, staggered filing requirements, and myriad
notification procedures).
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See discussion supra Part III.A (detailing China and India’s respective merger review
policies).
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competition law that fits within its own legal system and reflects its own
history and enforcement priorities?”166 One anticipated consequence is that a
true international framework would undermine country-specific goals in
adopting an antitrust law as a necessary consequence of international
harmonization.167 If a true international antitrust model is put in place under
the authority of an international body, nations like India and China that have
already adopted a competition law would be short-changed, as it is likely that
the U.S. and EU antitrust laws would act as the model for any such
international framework.168
Consequences such as these would likely
engender a great deal of resistance from China and India, who, as detailed
above, enacted competition laws as a means to protect their own domestic
markets from more established American and European corporations, as well
as to encourage international investment in their economies. These
nationalistic concerns, along with the fact that many countries still lack a
competition law, make it appear that harmonization under a large
international framework is unlikely to happen in the near future.169 While
full-scale international harmonization may not be a viable option presently,
there are still methods of harmonization that could benefit China and India
and the respective applications of their competition laws.
B. International Harmonization Mechanisms
Many models have been advanced as possible mechanisms for the
international harmonization of antitrust law, which can be filed under three
general classifications: hard harmonization, intermediate harmonization, and
soft harmonization.170 Essentially, hard harmonization is legally binding
international policy.171 As discussed above, this type of harmonization is
unlikely given the current pride of place given to the advancement of
domestic goals over assuaging international concerns among developing
166

Wood, supra note 158, at 398.
See id. at 405–06 (noting that developing countries often see themselves differently
situated from the U.S. and EU).
168
Crane, supra note 3, at 152–54.
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See DABBAH, supra note 7, at 6–7 (highlighting some of the relevant issues in the
adoption of a truly international competition law).
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Wood, supra note 158, at 404. These formulations are non–exclusive. Other experts in
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countries, China and India included. Some experts hold that hard
harmonization can be achieved through the WTO, but the general consensus
is that “[f]or many reasons . . . it seems clear that the world is not ready yet
for hard harmonization of competition laws.”172
Intermediate harmonization, which may also be referred to as the choice
of law option, is comprised of agreements among nations, like the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), to abide by specific bilateral or
multilateral resolutions between nations and to commit to some idea of “best
practices.”173 One of the main concerns with implementing this sort of
harmonization practice in the global context is that such agreements will be
either overbroad or so hyper specific that they are rendered meaningless and
ineffective.174 However, leading antitrust experts believe that a major step
towards the benefits of international antitrust harmonization is represented by
the guidelines propagated by the International Competition Network
(ICN).175 India is currently a member of the ICN, and many commentators
have urged China to subscribe to the organization’s “Recommended
Practices” guidelines.176 These pleas have thus far fallen on deaf ears, as
China remains unaffiliated with the ICN.177
Finally, soft harmonization, or “information sharing,” is comprised of
nonbinding, collaborative learning between countries that have adopted, or
are looking to adopt, an antitrust law.178 This method has been utilized by the
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), which
propagates goal-oriented texts on international competition law, none of
which are binding.179 This type of harmonization is already occurring in
China and India, as evidenced by the AML’s fourteen year gestation period
and India’s continued willingness to listen and implement suggestions from
the international community.180 In the long term, continuing openness to
172
Id. at 405; see also Andrew Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, 22 BERKELEY
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Guzman, supra note 172, at 370; Wood, supra note 158, at 404.
180
See discussion supra Part V (discussing the CCI’s willingness to consult with and adopt
suggestions from the international community); see also Wu, supra note 17, at 78 (detailing
how the international community was consulted throughout the drafting of the AML).

856

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 41:831

similar learning experiences could create a platform for more formal
harmonization between China, India, and the rest of the world. But for the
present, this soft harmonization approach is likely the best option for all
parties involved in the evolution of the AML and the Competition Act.181
Any attempt at a more extreme, binding type of international law will likely
be met with resistance from not only China and India, but other developing
economies as well. This would harm not only China and India’s interest in
continued international investment in their domestic industries, but also harm
more developed nations, like the U.S., in their attempts to expand domestic
business into emerging foreign markets. Because hard harmonization by its
nature is binding international law, it is unlikely that there will be any real
international push for the codification of such agreements. As a result, “soft
harmonization” will likely continue as the primary catalyst for global
harmonization in antitrust law.182
The consensus among the international community and international
business leaders is that some level of global harmonization in antitrust laws
is desirable.183 Therefore, the question for China and India is which of the
disparate harmonization approaches makes the most sense within the context
of their domestic goals and the application of their respective competition
laws. The three methods of harmonization discussed above each have their
defenders and detractors. The next section applies these perceived positives
and negatives and offers suggestions for how India and China can further
adapt their laws to fit into the global antitrust puzzle, while maintaining the
integrity of their domestic purposes and furthering their state-specific goals.
VI. ENDORSEMENT
Like many developing countries that have adopted competition laws,
China and India have done so to regulate their recently implemented market
economies, as well as to promote their own domestic goals.184 China aims to
maintain domestic tranquility and to promote the development and growth of
the “socialist market economy.”185 India wishes to regulate the continued
growth of its economy while maintaining a “level playing field” for their
domestic firms with regards to the recent influx of foreign corporations
181
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seeking to establish a presence on India’s economic landscape.186 These
goals will likely be undermined should China and India attempt to engage in
any sort of global, hard harmonization. Instead, it would be more beneficial
if the Chinese and Indian competition authorities remained open to
international input, via channels of soft harmonization, while further
attempting to follow some intermediate harmonization models.
It should be encouraging to the international community that the Chinese
and Indian competition authorities have thus far been open to feedback from
the international community and have proven willing, to an extent, to adapt
their laws to meet some of the more pointed criticisms leveled at the AML
and the Competition Act. If this level of receptiveness continues, many of
the concerns regarding the AML and the Competition Act may be remedied
organically as MOFCOM and the CCI become more adept at administering
their respective laws. To further promote foreign investment in their
countries and to assuage some of the fears engendered by their laws’
potential for extraterritorial application, China and India should both attempt
to be more transparent in applying their competition laws. “Transparency is
an important antidote to many pathologies . . . . It promotes clarity in policy
formation, increases the understanding of legal commands by affected
parties, and disciplines the exercise of discretion by public officials by
subjecting their actions to external review and criticism.”187 China and India
both benefit from further transparency in the application of their merger
regulation provisions. Thus far, as shown in the reasons offered by
MOFCOM for the block of the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan merger, China’s
competition authority has not been vague and uninstructive with their
interpretations of the AML’s merger provisions.
More concrete explanations of how the AML’s merger provisions are
applied would alleviate concerns over the potential for abuse by the Chinese
competition authorities. Due to the centralized nature of the Chinese
government, some observers might take further explanation of the merger
provisions with a grain of salt because the application of the AML will likely
shift as China’s domestic goals change. This, however, is true of
competition law in general.188 Therefore, greater transparency should still be
a goal for China’s competition authorities, as the increased insights into the
decision-making process would, as Kovacic states, make MOFCOM and its
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regulatory brethren accountable for their decisions.189 This accountability
should help China increase foreign investment in their industries via mergers,
as the increased accountability would relieve international tensions brought
on by a perceived foreign bias in China’s application of the AML.190
India would similarly benefit from greater transparency with regards to
how they utilize the information required by the Competition Act’s
notification procedures. More in depth explanation as to the interplay
between the CCI and the different sectoral regulators would allay
international business concerns over the confidentiality of potentially
sensitive information tendered during merger review, which would further
incentivize foreign investment in the Indian economy.
Increased transparency, in addition to maintaining policies in favor of
accepting international input and advice, would likely promote both
countries’ stated primary and secondary goals for their competition laws.
But these soft harmonization techniques are not the only harmonization
mechanisms of which China and India should avail themselves.
As noted in Part V.B, India is currently a member of the ICN while China
remains unaffiliated.191 Membership in the ICN is voluntary and, as of 2009,
ninety-two jurisdictions were contributing members in ICN’s mission “to
improve and advocate for sound competition policy and its enforcement
across the global antitrust community.”192 The ICN seeks input from its
member nations to cut down on inefficient application of competition law,
and China’s membership would likely enrich both MOFCOM’s expertise in
administering merger review as well as other ICN member-nations’
understanding of the AML. Because China invested so much research and
acquired so much feedback during the fourteen year gestation period of the
AML, its involvement in the ICN would both further global convergence of
competition law as well as provide additional reassurance to the international
community. Because involvement with the ICN is voluntary, China’s ability
to promote its “socialist market economy” would not face the same danger of
being swept away as it would if hard harmonization were implemented.193
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China’s involvement with ICN would be especially timely considering its
recent bilateral trade agreement with India.194
China and India have both made great strides in implementing successful
market economies in the last twenty years.195 Their implementation of
competition laws as a means to ensure continued growth, although causing
trepidation among the international business community, has thus far been a
reasonably smooth operation. Both countries would benefit from continued
input from more experienced antitrust authorities as their fledgling
enforcement authorities gain expertise.
Membership in non-binding
international groups like the ICN would benefit both countries by allowing
them access to greater levels of expertise from the international community,
while still imparting the added benefit of maintaining the freedom to promote
their respective domestic goals. These goals, the “socialist market economy”
in China and the “level playing field” in India, should be regarded by the
international community not as a millstone weighing down the economic
possibilities inherent in investment in China or India, but as another starting
point for debate and change in the field of international competition law.196
VII. CONCLUSION
China and India are two of the world’s largest and fastest growing
international markets. These countries recognize that to continue this
growth, effective regulation of their domestic industries must contend with
an increasing international presence as foreign firms seek to carve out a piece
of the Chinese and Indian markets. There are many other broad similarities
between the two nations’ respective economic situations: each have, in the
last twenty years, decided that a domestic movement toward a market
economy is necessary to ensure their continued economic evolution; both
view their implementation of more modern, internationally friendly
competition laws as crucial to this evolution’s success; and both, while
inviting foreign investment in their economies, are utilizing their competition
laws to ensure that the international presence in their markets does not
overwhelm their domestic industry.
However, the two Asian powers also have their own specific, domestic
goals they hope to promote through the implementation of their competition
194
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laws. For China, this goal is to promote a “Harmonious Society” and to
allow for the continuing growth of their “socialist market economy.” India,
meanwhile, seeks simply to maintain a “level playing field” for the growth of
their domestic industries. Due to the relative newness of these two countries’
competition laws generally, and the merger provisions specifically, the
international antitrust community has concerns about how the laws will be
applied in the future. The AML and the Competition Act each contain
provisions that make clear the laws apply extraterritorially, which causes
further trepidation among the international community. However, China and
India have, throughout the gestation periods for their competition laws,
shown themselves to be open and accepting of international input regarding
how their competition laws can function most effectively in the international
context.
There is general agreement that further convergence among the world’s
antitrust laws is a positive goal, and is one that the international community
should attempt to facilitate. The debate begins once the conversation turns to
how such harmonization should occur. There are many disparate ideas as to
the most effective way to encourage global harmonization, and they can be
broadly grouped under the headings of soft, intermediate, and hard antitrust
harmonization. Soft harmonization is the most widespread method currently
in practice, as it is the least binding of the three, and is essentially just the
voluntary exchange of information between countries.
Intermediate
harmonization, as well as hard harmonization, have both been found to be
appropriate in some specific contexts, but are not as widely adopted as the
less binding soft harmonization model.
To further their specific domestic goals, China and India should continue
their practice of accepting and listening to the ideas posited by international
experts to encourage further investment in their respective economies. Also,
both countries should strive to promote greater transparency in the
application of their competition laws in order to mollify foreign concerns
over the potential for arbitrary enforcement and to encourage beneficial
mergers to be pursued in their countries.
While hard harmonization is unlikely to be viewed favorably by China or
India, an intermediate resolution such as China’s membership in the ICN,
would prove beneficial for both competition regimes. Each country has
received enormous amounts of international expertise throughout the drafting
and implementation of their competition laws, and their competition
authorities’ unique perspectives should prove valuable to other ICN
members. If both countries take active roles in the global antitrust and
merger review conversation, it might sharpen the Chinese and Indian
competition authorities’ skills in the application of their laws and in their
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merger review process, thus assuaging international fears of extraterritorial
abuse and potentially hastening the slow current of global antitrust law
harmonization.
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